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COMMENTARIES
REANIMATOR: MARK TUSHNET AND THE SECOND
COMING OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
Neal Devins"

A world without judicial review? Not that long ago-when the Left
fought tooth and nail to defend the legacy of theWarren and (much
of the) Burger Courts-the thought of taking the Constitution away
from the courts would have been horrific. Witness, for example,
Edward Kennedy's depiction of "Robert Bork's America" as "a land
in which women would be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks
would sit at segregated lunch counters, [and] rogue police could
break down citizens' doors in midnight raids."1 Bork's sin, of course,
was embracing a kind of populist constitutional discourse, that is,
the notion that the founders "banked a good deal upon the good
sense ofthe people" and their elected representatives to sort out the
meaning of equality, due process, and the like.2
Bork, however, never questioned the finality of Supreme Court
decisions.3 Ronald Reagan's Attorney General Edwin Meese stepped
on that landmine in October 1987 when he claimed that only the
Constitution, not the decisions of the Supreme Court, binds the

* Goodrich Professor ofLaw and Lecturerin Government, College ofWilliam and Mary.
Thanks to Mark Tushnet and the University of Richmond Law Review for asking me to
participate in this symposium.
1. 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
2. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 114-17 (1987)
(statement of Robert H. Bork).
3. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw 3 (1990) (explaining that "[w]hen the Supreme Court invokes the Constitution, whether
legitimately or not, as to that issue the democratic process is at an end").
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government.4 The American Civil Liberties Union, the New York
Times, and the Washington Post took aim at Meese, dubbing his
comments a 'jurisprudential stink bomb" and an invitation to
"anarchy."5
How things change. Today, the Left is increasingly skeptical of a
judge-centered Constitution. In part, smarting from several
Rehnquist Court defeats, progressives see elected government as
more apt to embrace their agenda than the judiciary. Furthermore,
much of the Court's salience as an agent for social change has been
obliterated. There is an increasing recognition both of the Court's
tendency to follow the election returns and of the pivotal role that
social movements play in transforming society.
The Left's embrace of the Constitution outside of Court, however,
is hardly a call for the end of judicial review. Instead, progressives
-like Ruth Bader Ginsburg-speak of 'judges play[ing] an interdependent part in our democracy ... participat[ing] in a dialogue with
other organs of government, and with the people as well."6 For this
very reason, some progressives see the Court as a benificent
democracy-forcing facilitator, encouraging elected government and
the people to engage in constructive constitutional dialogues. 7
But do the courts really play a constructive role in shaping
constitutional values? And if not, what should stop us from amending the Constitution to preclude judicial review altogether? For
Mark Tushnet, the answers to these questions are no and nothing.
And by laying down the gauntlet, Tushnet's Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts8 forces us to confront the most basic question
in constitutional law.
In the pages that follow, I will defend Tushnet's decision to tackle
this most basic question. There is good reason for progressives (and
others) to question the "value added" of court interpretations of the

4. See Edwin Meese III, The Law ofthe Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REv. 979, 983 (1987).
5. Michael Kinsley, Meese's Stink Bomb, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, atA19; see Anthony
Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, atA23; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Liberties Union
Denounces Meese, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1986, at A17. Even the American Bar Association
denounced Meese, arguing that White House challenges to Supreme Court decision-making
would "shake the foundations ofour system." Id. (quoting ABA President Eugene C. Thomas).
6. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198
(1992) (footnote omitted).
7. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
8. MARK.TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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Constitution. But even if Tushnet's assessment of the limited
benefits and significant costs ofjudicial review is correct, his call for
populist constitutional discourse does not make sense in the real
world. In particular, the competing incentives and powers of the
White House and Congress will yield a constitutional order dominated by a single branch, the Executive. More to the point, it is hard
to reconcile a constitutional order dominated by a single individual
with Tushnet's call for populist constitutional discourse.

***
Mark Tushnet is right. There is good reason to doubt the efficacy
of judicial review. 9 To start with, it is not especially consequential.
Take Brown v. Board of Education, 10 arguably the most important
case in modern constitutional law. By itself, Brown accomplished
next to nothing. In the decade following the decision, less actual
desegregation occurred than in 1965 alone. The reason: In 1965,
Southern school systems had financial incentives to desegregate. At
that time, Congress made available millions of dollars .in federal
funds to nondiscriminatory public school systems.11 Whether or not
"the political landscape in the mid-1960s would have looked the
same even if Brown had been decided differently,"12 it is quite clear
that social and political forces, not judicial edicts, made school
desegregation a reality.
Judicial review, moreover, is hardly ever counter-majoritarian.
Even when striking down legislation, the Supreme Court is often
validating elected government preferences. For example, in
recognizing a married couple's right to use contraceptives at a time
when only two states banned the use of contraceptives, the Court
did little more than act "on behalf of a national political majority

9. The analysis which follows is an elaboration of several of the (undoubtedly true)
empirical assertions that help ground Mark Tushnet's case against judicial review. I do not,
however, rely on any of the (highly debatable) normative claims that figure into Tushnet's
detailed and nuanced case against judicial review. In particular, I reject Tusbnet's claim that
the only part of the Constitution worth honoring is the Preamble. See id. at 12. Tushnet is
willing to take this step because he thinks that constitutional interpretation is about power,
not the search for truth. See id. For me, this effort to elevate the so-called "thin Constitution"
would neuter the Constitution altogether. For a detailed assessment ofTusbnet's normative
claims, see Saikrishna Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 548-52 (1999)
(reviewing MARKTuSHNET, TAKING THE CoNSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)).
10. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
11. See GARY 0RFIELD, PuBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 19681980, at 5-7 (1983); GARY 0RFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION 2-3
(1969).
12. TuSHNET, supra note 8, at 146.
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that has not yet worked its will through legislation."13 More
fundamentally, when it is willing to break ranks with elected
government, the Court "rarely holds out for an extended period
against a sustained national political majority. "14 The Lochner15 era
gave way to the New Deal Court; Roe v. Wade's 16 absolutism was
replaced by Planned Parenthood v. Casey's 17 moderation; Mapp v.
Ohio 18 likewise gave way to good faith and other exceptions; forced
busing gave way to a series of Rehnquist Court decisions valuing
local control; and so on and so forth.
None of this is to say, as Henry Steele Commager argued, "that
had there never been an instance of judicial nullification of a
congressional act, our constitutional system would essentially be the
same as it is today." 19 It is to say that courts cannot accomplish all
that much (at least not without populist support). For this very
reason, the costs of judicial review must be considered.

Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts calls attention to
some of the costs of judicial review. Of particular concern to
Tushnet are institutional costs, especially the fact that judicial
review encourages policymakers to care less about the Constitution.
Rather than struggle over the possible constitutionality of their
handiwork, lawmakers can simply delegate that question to the
courts. Indeed, members of Congress (especially nonlawyer members) typically pass constitutional questions along to the courts.20
For example, in urging Congress to enact the National Industrial
Recovery Act, Franklin Delano Roosevelt told Congress that "'the
situation is so urgent and the benefits of the legislation so evident

13. Id. at 144; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to
use contraceptives).
14. TuSHNET, supra note 8, at 134. On this point, Tushnet looks to Robert Dahl's seminal
study, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6
J. PuB. L. 279 (1957). See also Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy
Making, 70 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 50 (1976); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The
Supreme Court As a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of1'ublic Opinion on
Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 87 (1993).
15. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
17. 505 u.s. 833 (1992).
18. 367 u.s. 643 (1961).
19. HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 47 (1943). For a
more contemporary account (that essentially reaches the same conclusion), see GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
20. See DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF
RESPONSffiiLITY 336 (1966); Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two
Committees, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 317, 319-20 (1993).
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that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the bill, leaving to the
courts . . . the ultimate question of constitutionality."'21 More
recently, Congress has included in several recent statutes a
procedure to permit quick challenges before the Supreme Court.22
The not-so-hidden message in statutes that contain expedited
review procedures: "We're not sure about the constitutionality of
what we have done. But the statute is politically popular and we
don't want to figure out whether we bungled it. But don't worry. The
Court will set it right."23
Another way in which "judicial overhang distorts what legislators
say about the Constitution" is that legislative consideration of
constitutional matters is little more than an attempt by lawmakers
to fit their statutes into preexisting Supreme Court doctrine. 24 For
example, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees are understood to take constitutional interpretation seriously because they
are keenly interested in whether the Court will uphold their actions,
and are therefore willing to moderate the legislation they produce.25
In other words, rather than develop their own distinctive interpretive methodologies, lawmakers (when they talk about the Constitution) almost always mimic the Supreme Court.26 And when Congress
does respond to Court decision-making, the cost of ensuring
compliance with judicial norms is significant. To "credibly claim"
that the federal Flag Protection Act would satisfy the Supreme
Court, for example, "the statute had almost nothing to do with what
its supporters thought a flag protection law ought to do."27

21. TusHNET, supra note 8, at 57 (quoting Letter from President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt to Congressman Hill (July 6, 1935), in 4FRANKLINDELANOROOSEVELT, THE PuBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 297 (1950)).
22. Examples of statutes in which Congress has incorporated this procedure include the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of1985, 2 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) (1994); the Flag Protection Act of
1989,18 U.S.C. § 700(1994); the Line-Item VetoActof1996, 2U.S.C. § 691 (Supp. ill 1997);
and the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 4 7 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp.ill 1998).
23. For a floor speech that, more or less, tracks the above language, see 141 CONG. REo.
S4244 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Paul Simon).
24. TusHNET, supra note 8, at 57.
25. See NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONALVALUES 123-31 (1996); Miller, supra note
20, at 328-32, 337-42, 347-53.
26. See TusHNET,supra note 8, at 58-65. In many ways, Executive Branch interpretations
of the Constitution also mimic the Supreme Court. For example, rather than call upon
Congress to embrace a theory of federalism at odds with the Court, Bush administration
officials-when testifying against freedom of choice legislation-served up a narrow
construction of Supreme Court case law. See 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsell (1992).
27. TusHNET, supra note 8, at 59:
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The question remains: Is judicial review, ultimately, counterproductive? For example, if judicial supremacy contributes to political
stability,28 policymakers should think ofways to leave the Constitution to the Court. Alternatively, if elected branch interpretations do
little more than perpetrate social injustice, well, there would be good
reason to encourage elected officials to follow the Court's lead.
Neither of these things is true, however. Without the powers of
purse and sword, the Court itself recognizes that it "must take care
to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions."29
As such, political stability can only be achieved if Court decisions
are somewhat consistent with elected government preferences.30
Indeed, elected government intervention is necessary, in part, to
stave off the destabilizing effects of Court decisions that limit
individual and minority rights. Among other things, lawmakers
have responded to restrictive Supreme Court rulings on child labor,
public accommodation, search and seizure, freedom of the press,
voting rights, women in the military, and religious freedom. 31
Considering the general unwillingness of Congress to countermand the Court, these examples suggest that -lawmakers are able
to play a constructive role in shaping constitutional values. For their
part, Supreme Court Justices sometimes prove inept at constitutional interpretation. Although Tushnet's claim that "the proportion
of constitutional fools on the Supreme Court approaches that in
Congress"32 may overstate matters, it is nevertheless true that
federal judges "can be lazy, lack judicial temperament . . . [and]
pursue a nakedly political agenda" without fear ofremoval.33
In the end, there is no argument for judicial supremacy. A stable,
enduring constitutional order must involve elected officials as well
as the people. It is also true that social and political forces, not

28. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1371-81 (1997) (arguing that the settlement of
contested issues is a crucial component of constitutionalism and that the Supreme Court can
achieve this goal by acting as an authoritative interpreter).
29. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
30. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA.
L. REV. 83, 90-106 (1998).
31. Along these lines, an argument can be made that the hidden agenda of Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts is the advancementofLeftypolitical causes. See Prakash,
supra note 9, at 552. I do not agree with Prakash's claim, although I understand why a
skeptical reader ofTushnet's book would reach this conclusion.
32. TuSHNET, supra note 8, at 56.
33. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 111 (1995).
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judicial review, define most of our constitutional order. Consequently, if judicial review creates disincentives for lawmakers to
think seriously about the Constitution, there is reason to question
(as a policy matter) the sensibility of judicial review. 34 But is it not
possible that taking the Constitution away from the Court will
create a new set of problems that are even more costly than the
costs ofjudicial review? Here, I think, is where Tushnet's argument
against judicial review comes apart.
Let us start with Congress. True, judicial review creates disincentives for lawmakers to invest much energy in constitutional
interpretation. But without judicial review, there is little reason to
think that Congress will pay significantly more attention to the
Constitution than it does today. 35 Consider, for example, the reasons
why most members of Congress find service on the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees unattractive. 36 Motivated by reelection, power within Congress, and the ability to reward constituencies, there is little gain in sorting out national policy on divisive
issues like abortion, affirmative action, and gun control.37 Correspondingly, those lawmakers who seek out these committees tend
to be "true believers," individuals who do not feel the heat for taking
a stand on contentious constitutional questions. For these reasons,
party leaders have difficulty finding members to staff the Judiciary
Committees (especially members who are also acceptable to hardliners within the Committee).38
Might these incentives change if the Constitution were taken
away from the Court? After all, interest groups would increasingly
see Congress as the "Court oflast resort" and, accordingly, pressure
Congress to pay greater attention to constitutional questions. But

34. Indeed, in recent years, proposals have been advanced to give Congress a veto over
judicial decisions or to take life tenure away from the courts. See ROBERT H. BoRK,
SLOUCHING TOWARD GoMORRAH 117 (1996) (discussing a proposal to give Congress the power
to override judicial decisions); Prakash, supra note 9, at 568-84 (discussing a proposal to
eliminate life tenure on the judiciary).
35. Tushnet, while conceding that Congress now pays scant attention to the Constitution,
argues that lawmakers might well invest in the Constitution "if [they] knew that they were
responsible for [it]." TusHNET, supra note 8, at 66.
36. See CHRISTOPHERJ. DEERING & STEVENS. SMITH, COMMITI'EES IN CONGRESS 58-123
(3d ed. 1997); David E. Price, Congressional Committees in the Policy Process, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 161, 162 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 3d ed. 1985).
37. Indeed, lawmakers often seek cover in Supreme Court rulings in order to avoid such
decisional costs. See sources cited supra note 36; Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUDIES IN AM. PoL. DEV. 35 (1993).
38. See DEERING & Sl\nTH, supra note 36, at 81-82.
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interest groups already pressure Congress on a broad range of
constitutional questions. Indeed, responding to interest group
pressures, Congress sought to countermand Supreme Court
decisions on voting rights, flag burning, abortion, school prayer,
busing, religious liberty, and a host of other contentious issues. To
the extent that Congress is a reactive institution,39 it may be that
judicial review often provides the necessary spur to legislative
consideration of constitutional questions.
Of course, without the fear of judicial nullification Congress can
make bolder policy than it does today. And it may be that some
interest groups intemalize the risks of judicial invalidation, and
therefore, do not press Congress as hard as they might. At the same
time, other interest groups may not have .pressured Congress
precisely because they thought that the courts would strike down
legislation inconsistent with their beliefs. Consequently, it is
doubtful that-in a world without judicial review-Congress will
moderate its handiwork all that much. 40
What will change is the type ofconstitutional discourse that takes
place within Congress. No longer will the Judiciary Committees
employ the language of the Supreme Court when debating constitutional questions. Whether Congress will develop its own modalities
of constitutional interpretation (or, for that matter, talk much about
the Constitution) is another matter altogether. Most committees
within Congress see constitutional arguments as simply another
roadblock standing in the way ofwhat they want to accomplish. For
that reason, most congressional committees do not talk about the
Constitution at all. Consider, for example, the House Energy and
Commerce Committee. As one staff member who worked for both
the Judiciary and Energy and Commerce Committees put it: "'A
good legal argument wins on Judiciary; power wins on Energy and
Commerce. Power, not legal training, is the most important thing on
Commerce. Commerce doesn't listen to legal arguments, just

39. See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 207, 211 (1984); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166, 173-74 (1984).
40. At the state level, however, it is easy to imagine a more profound change taking place.
In the aftermath of Court decisions expanding state authority to regulate abortion, for
example, once dormant court-dependent pro-choice interests were awakened. See DEVINS,
supra note 25, at 67-77. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, unfortunately, does
not take the states into account. Indeed, Tushnet does not even consider the very real
possibility that state court interpretations of state constitutional provisions will fill much of
the void left by federal court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.
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ideology.'"41 For another staff member: "Energy and Commerce
members move quickly to fix the problems before them without
getting bogged down in fruitless debates over the possible constitutionality ofthe bills before them."42 Consequently, when the Reagan
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") questioned the
constitutionality of awarding racial preferences, the Energy and
Commerce Committee castigated all five commissioners for hiding
behind the Constitution. Committee member AI Swift, for example,
bemoaned the FCC's "legalistic gobbledygook," remarking that "I am
not a lawyer, and I am mystified by them all the time."43
Perhaps taking the Constitution away from the courts will change
this practice. Perhaps members of power and constituency committees will take more seriously their duty to independently assess the
constitutionality of their actions. Perhaps, but do not count on it.
Members join these committees either to assume power or to serve
their constituents (and thereby improve their chances ofreelection).
It is hard to see how the evisceration of judicial review will fundamentally change that reality.

***
My skepticism, I think, is well founded. But let us say that I am
wrong and that "[p]olitical calculations [about the importance of
constitutional debate] might change if [the] people [and their
representatives] knew that they were responsible for the Constitution."44 After all, judicial review is not especially consequential, nor
especially countermajoritarian. Consequently, only a marginal
improvement in congressional deliberation about the Constitution
would warrant taking the Constitution away from the courts.
In critical respects, Tushnet embraces this type of cost-benefit
analysis. He never says that Congress will do a much better job
than it does today. Rather, his view is that Congress may do a better
job and-in light ofthe Court's limitations-that is enough.45 Tushnet,
moreover, sees Congress as the seat of populist government. As he
states: "The position I have developed would make the Constitution
41. Miller, supra note20, at341-42 (quoting a 1989 interview with a Judiciary Committee
staff member).
42. Id. at 345 (quoting an interview with an Energy and Commerce staff member).
43. Minority-Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance ofthe House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong. 53-55 (1986) (statement of Rep. Al Swift).
44. TusHNET, supra note 8, at 66.
45. See id. at 168-69.
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what a majority of Congress says it is."46 But what about the
Executive? For sure, Tushnet recognizes that the White House will
play a large role in shaping populist constitutionallaw.47 Yet, the
focus of Tushnet's brand of populism is legislation, not regulation.
Specifically, he imagines that the White House and Congress will
"appeal to the court of public opinion" as they bargain over the
content of constitutionallawmaking.48
On this point, however, I think Tushnet does not consider how it
is that the Executive will manipulate the Constitution far more
often and far more successfully than Congress. "The opportunities
for presidential imperialism are too numerous to count," according
to Terry Moe and William Howell, ''because when presidents feel it
is in their political interests, they can put whatever decisions they
like to strategic use, both in gaining policy advantage and in
pushing out the boundaries of their power."49 When presidents act,
moreover, it is up to the other branches to respond. In other words,
presidents often win by default-either because Congress chooses not
to respond, or its response is ineffective.5°
Put another way: The President is able to exercise agenda control
precisely because he is an executive (with the reins of government
in his hands). Furthermore, because the President is a unitary actor
and the Congress is made up of 535 in<Uvidual actors, the President
can advance (and can seek to build public support around) a
singular vision of the Constitution. For this very reason, on matters
where the President can exercise unilateral power, presidential

46. Id. at 52.
47. See id. at 120.
48. Id.
49. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999) (arguing that "the president's base of independent
authority . .. is enhanced ... by the executive nature of his constitutional job").
50. For example, Congress overrode only three of one-thousand executive orders issued
between 1973 and 1997. See id. at 165-66.
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interpretations of the Constitution (at least in a world without
judicial review) are often synonymous with the Constitution itself.51
Consider, for example, war powers. Here, the constitutional
design envisions (at a minimum) a significant congressional role.
Notwithstanding this clear constitutional mandate, Congress has
very little incentive to play a leadership role. Why? Although each
of Congress's 535 members have some stake in Congress as an
institution, parochial interests invariably overwhelm this collective
good. Consequently, rather than oppose the President's military
initiatives, members of Congress "find it more convenient to
acquiesce and avoid criticism that they obstructed a necessary
mission."52 Presidents, in contrast, achieve fame by leading the
nation into battle and, consequently, have strong incentives to
launch military strikes.53
War powers is anything but an isolated example. Whenever
Congress delegates power to an Executive Branch agency, the
President is well positioned to advance his constitutional agenda.
Indeed, even if Congress disapproves of his regulatory initiatives,
the President still gets his way. Take the case of the Reagan and
Bush administrations' abortion counseling initiatives. After
Congress rejected Reagan administration efforts to enact legislation
prohibiting recipients of federal family-planning funding from
talking about abortion, the administration promulgated regulations
on this very subject. Finding this gag rule ''bizarre and cruel," fortyfive Senators cosponsored legislation to overturn it.54 But, President
Bush used his veto power to stave off this legislative campaign. And

51. I do not mean to suggest here that the President is unconstrained in his actions.
To a greater or lesser degree, presidents are representatives of a preexisting
political coalition. That coalition places independent demands on the president,
which the president will likely seek to meet both out of a sense of political
obligation, in payment for earlier assistance rendered, and in expectation of
future legacies.
Keith E. Whittington, The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy (unpublished
manuscript at 9, on file with author); see also STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS
PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 17-32 (1993).
52. Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 931, 1006 (1999).
53. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 700 (1997).
54. See John Chaffe, Congress Should Remedy the Court's Decision, WASH. POST, June
7, 1991, at A23. Senator Chaffe's Op-ed was written in the immediate aftermath of Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), a Supreme Court decision upholding the gag rule. See id. at
203.
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a Congressional override failed, with the House voting 276 to 156 to
override the veto.
The gag rule is telling for another reason. It calls attention to the
transience and ultimate instability of a presidentially-centered
constitutional order. Just days after taking office, Bill Clinton
repealed the gag rule. Condemning both the Reagan and Bush
administrations for promulgating and defending the gag rule,
Clinton argued that the rule "endanger[ed] women's lives" and was
of questionable legal validity. 55 Needless to say, to the victor go the
spoils and, consequently, Clinton was in no way bound to follow the
constitutional opinions of his predecessor.56
In a world without judicial review, however, the power of each
administration to embrace a radically different conception of
constitutional truth comes at a great cost. Specifically, the idea of
law as a stabilizing force cannot be reconciled with a regime in
which each presidential election serves as a national referendum
about which vision of constitutional truth sits well with the
electorate. 57 Rather, a stable constitutional order requires some
baseline. In particular, a government of laws must be constrained
by law. And, if elections are the only constraint on populist sentiment, the Constitution begins to look more and more like an
historical relic-not a rule oflaws that constrain government. ''What
a government oflimited powers needs," as Charles Black observed,
"at the beginning and forever, is some means of satisfying the people
that it has taken all steps humanly possible to stay within its
powers."58 In other words, there must be continuity to the rule oflaw
in a government oflaw. And, while courts are greatly influenced by
social and political forces, there nevertheless is a continuity to their
decision-making.

55. Memorandum for the Secretary of Health and Human Services on the Title X "Gag
Rule," 29 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 88 (Jan. 22, 1993).
56. See Jeremy Rabkin & Neal Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree:
Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40
STAN. L. REV. 203, 228-46 (1987) (providing a textual defense ofthis claim).
57. This is especially true since most Americans pay little mind to constitutional
questions. See Thomas E. Baker, Marbury v. Madison-Requiescat in Pace?, 83 JUDICATURE
83 (Sept/Oct. 1999) (referencing a study that reported that only five percent of Americans
could correctly answer ten basic questions about the Constitution). Of course, as Tushnet
argues, more voters might pay attention to the Constitution in a world without judicial
review. But they might not. After all, nonjudicial interpretations already play a dominant role
in the shaping of constitutional values.
58. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 52 (1960).
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But, if the Supreme Court largely follows the election returns,
how can judicial review operate as a stabilizing, legitimating force
in our constitutional order? In other words, if Tushnet goes too far
in seeing the benefits of a world without judicial review, do I not go
too far in seeing the benefits of judicial review?
Maybe, but I do not think so. The "judicial overhang" of which
Tushnet complains actually operates as a legitimating constraint on
elected government interpretations of the Constitution, especially
Executive Branch interpretations. The Office of Legal Counsel
("OLC"), for example, treats both Supreme Court decisions and OLC
precedents as a source oflegal authority in its interpretations ofthe
Constitution.59 Without judicial review, there is good reason to
question what, if anything, would constrain the OLC. No longer
would the OLC need its own precedents to counterbalance those of
the Supreme Court. Instead, each administration might see the
national election as a referendum on its constitutional philosophy
(so that little weight would be accorded to prior Executive Branch
interpretations). The Supreme Court, in contrast, largely adheres to
past precedent. In part, this is a manifestation of the instrumental
role that stare decisis plays in legitimating their decisions.60 In part,
it is a by-product of the fact that changes in Court doctrine occur
gradually. With nine Justices and life tenure, the Court is not apt
to flip flop with each election.
True stability and, with it, the notion of the Constitution as
supreme law of the land, needs all parts of government to participate in constitutional dialogues with one another. Just as judicial
supremacy is not the answer, neither is the elimination of judicial
review. Whatever the limits of judicial review may be, the cost of
taking the Constitution away from the Court is too great. Whatever
its deficiencies and limitations, judicial review is critical to the
maintenance of our constitutional order.

59. See John 0 . McGinnis, Models. of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A
Normative Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 380-82, 434
(1993).
60. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992).

